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REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY AND  
THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION
Kelly James Clark and Justin L. Barrett
Reformed epistemology and cognitive science have remarkably converged 
on belief in God. Reformed epistemology holds that belief in God is basic—
that is, belief in God is a natural, non-inferential belief that is immediately 
produced by a cognitive faculty. Cognitive science of religion also holds that 
belief in gods is (often) non-reflectively and instinctively produced—that is, 
non-inferentially and automatically produced by a cognitive faculty or sys-
tem. But there are differences. In this paper, we will show some remarkable 
points of convergence, and a few points of divergence, between Reformed 
epistemology and the cognitive science of religion. 
Introduction
Reformed epistemology and cognitive science have remarkably converged 
on belief in God. Reformed epistemology holds that belief in God is basic—
that is, belief in God is a natural, non-inferential belief that is immediately 
produced by a cognitive faculty.1 Cognitive science of religion also holds 
that belief in gods is (often) non-reflectively and instinctively produced—
that is, non-inferentially and automatically produced by a cognitive faculty 
or system.2 But there are prima facie differences. Reformed epistemologists 
hold that the god-faculty was implanted in each person by God while the 
cognitive scientist typically holds that the god-faculty developed in each 
person through evolutionary processes. Cognitive science is the relatively 
recent work of empirical psychologists who find inspiration in empiri-
cal psychology and in the work of Darwin; contemporary cognitive scien-
tists of religion include Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran, and Justin Barrett. Both 
1See Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); 
Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Faith and Rationality (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1983); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976); and William Alston, Perceiving 
God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). For a more popular introduction to Reformed 
epistemology, see Kelly James Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 1990).
2Cognitive scientists of religion differ as to whether a single cognitive device accounts for 
theistic beliefs (e.g., Stewart Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion [New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993]), or whether a constellation of devices converge to promote 
belief in God (e.g., Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained [New York: Basic Books, 2001]). ‘God 
faculty’ is used here to refer to whatever cognitive functional unit or units are responsible for 
generating belief in God.
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groups contend that we have natural cognitive faculties or faculties which 
produce belief in God immediately without the support of an inference. 
According to Barrett, “Belief in God or gods is not some artificial intrusion 
into the natural state of human affairs. Rather, belief in gods generally and 
God particularly arises through the natural, ordinary operation of human 
minds in natural ordinary environments.”3
In this paper, we will show some remarkable points of convergence, 
and a few points of divergence, between Reformed epistemology and the 
cognitive science of religion. 
Reformed Epistemology: Calvin vs. Plantinga
John Calvin believed that God provided all humans with a natural, in-
stinctual sense of the divine, the sensus divinitatis, which is inscribed or 
written on the hearts of all people. This natural knowledge of some kind 
of God is that “primal and simple knowledge to which the very order of 
nature would have led us if Adam had remained upright.”4 This slight 
taste of his divinity amounts to little more than the conviction that there is 
a God, that humans acquire the true belief that there is a majestic creator. 
This knowledge includes all of the properties necessary for being creator—
super powers and intellect—but little of what is necessary for human re-
demption. Calvin seems to hold that this knowledge of God’s existence 
and basic attributes is present from birth and not experience-dependent.
Calvin also claims that there is an additional, external source of knowl-
edge of God. He contends that people can behold the glory of God through 
the manifestation of the divine in nature; we can see God in both the vast-
ness of the cosmos and the human person. Indeed, Calvin believes that 
knowledge of God is so manifest and evident that detailed arguments are 
unnecessary. Because God has made himself so readily available to us in 
his creation, detailed arguments are unnecessary. One, whether peasant 
or physiologist or physicist, can quite simply see the order and symmetry 
of the cosmos and human person and so become aware of the being on 
whom that order and symmetry depend.
Alvin Plantinga has advanced a notion of the sensus divinitatis that dif-
fers from John Calvin’s. Plantinga contends that our god-faculty is disposi-
tional and that belief in God is grounded in human experience. Plantinga 
argues that belief in God is produced in response to a variety of widely real-
ized circumstances such as moments of guilt, gratitude, or a sense of God’s 
handiwork in nature (while beholding the articulate beauty of a flower or 
the purple mountains majesty); in these and other circumstances, people 
find themselves believing in God. While Plantinga holds that belief in God, 
thusly produced, is based on experience, and so is not groundless, it is not, 
however, based on beliefs, and so is not the conclusion of an argument. 
3Justin Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Lanham, Maryland: AltaMira, 2004), 
p. 124.
4John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1975), I. ii. 1.
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Finally, Plantinga contends that the sensus divinitatis produces belief in the 
God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of the Bible. 
The Cognitive Science of Religion and the Sensus Divinitatis
If the position of Reformed epistemologists is correct that the automatic, 
non-reflective deliverances of our cognitive faculties should be treated 
as innocent until proven guilty, and if humans are naturally endowed 
with a god-faculty or sensus divinitatis, then belief in the divine should 
be treated as innocent until proven guilty. Reformed epistemologists and 
theologians have advanced arguments for the existence of a god-facul-
ty, but given recent scientific advances in understanding human minds, 
might there be scientific evidence for something like a sensus divinitatis? If 
so, which version of the god-faculty does the evidence support, Calvin’s, 
Plantinga’s, or another version altogether? In this section we present three 
naturalistic accounts gleaned from the cognitive science of religion litera-
ture regarding where beliefs in gods come from and compare what this 
contemporary science suggests with regard to Calvin’s and Plantinga’s 
characterizations of the god-faculty.
In general, cognitive science of religion rejects the popular anthropo-
logical assumption of radical incommensurability among cultural groups. 
Rather, studies seem to show that our common biological heritage and rel-
atively similar environments produce relatively similar minds and, often, 
beliefs. Rejecting the empiricist assumption of the mind as a blank slate, 
cognitive science holds that our minds come equipped with cognitive fac-
ulties that actively process our perceptions and shape our conceptions of 
the world.5 These common cognitive faculties are specialized subsystems 
that structure, inform, enhance and limit the way we think about the world 
around us. Some of these cognitive faculties structure, inform, enhance 
and limit religious beliefs. Belief in gods, to take one characteristic form of 
religious belief, arises from the stimulation of universal cognitive faculties. 
That is, because of the characteristic architecture of human minds, inde-
pendent of special enculturation, humans are receptive to the existence of 
gods and readily reason about their activities and form collective actions 
(such as rituals) in response to these beliefs. From the perspective of cogni-
tive science of religion, beliefs in gods are a natural product of our com-
mon cognitive faculties, and in this sense, religious belief is ‘natural.’
While the naturalness of religion thesis has general consensus in the 
cognitive science of religion area, the specific way in which ordinary, 
natural cognitive architecture promotes belief in gods (in populations) is 
a subject of debate. Concerning the character of the god-faculty, at least 
three different types of accounts have been developed. For the following 
discussion, we dub these three the Attribution Account, the Dispositional 
Account, and the Preparedness Account. Though not necessarily incom-
5See Pascal Boyer, The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1994), Pt. II.
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mensurable, the three accounts do suggest slightly different features of 
the god-faculty in terms of the conditions under which it is activated (in-
put conditions) and the characteristic outputs.
The Attribution Account. The Attribution Account claims that beliefs in 
supernatural agents, including ghosts, ancestor-spirits, and gods, have 
arisen in part because human beings are equipped with a functional 
cognitive unit—an agency-detecting device—that identifies objects as 
intentional agents or events as caused by intentional agents, sometimes 
with only the slightest stimulation.6 Anthropologist Stewart Guthrie has 
argued that this faculty for detecting agents (such as large mammals and 
other humans) has been tuned by natural selection to err on the side of 
generating false-positives. Because the presence of intentional agents in 
our ancestral environment would have represented our greatest threats to 
survival as well as greatest promise for survival and reproduction, detect-
ing even the slightest evidence for the presence of an intentional agent 
would have been critical. It would be better to register that a potential 
helpful or dangerous agent is nearby based on scant evidence and prove to 
be mistaken, than miss the presence of an agent. Without such immediate 
beliefs/responses to certain motions (rustling bushes) or sounds (things 
going bump in the night), we might end up food for a predator or victim 
of an enemy.
The faculty responsible for attributing intentional agency to objects or 
to the cause of events or traces (such as tracks, crop-circles, or signs), has 
been termed the “hypersensitive agency detection device” (HADD); “hy-
persensitive” emphasizing its tuning to register false-positives instead of 
failing to detect actual agents by using too strict input conditions (Barrett, 
2004). If it were less sensitive it would prove less adaptive.
In the normal course of human life, we perceive human forms, human 
faces, human voices, and artifacts, and HADD automatically, non-reflec-
tively attributes human agency as the source. Then a second cognitive 
system responsible for generating inferences related to mental states—
the Theory of Mind (ToM)—is activated and automatically fills in details 
about the (human) agent’s likely beliefs, desires, emotions, and so forth. 
Occasionally, however, sounds, shapes, patterns, or movement trigger a 
‘HADD-experience,’ an attribution of agency, that is inconsistent with any 
known natural agents such as humans or animals. In these situations, the 
activity of HADD may lead to the postulation of a different sort of agent 
such as a god. Barrett explains: 
Our minds have numerous pattern detectors that organize visual infor-
mation into meaningful units. HADD remains on the lookout for patterns 
known to be caused by agents. If this patterned information matches pat-
terns . . . known to be caused by agents, HADD detects agency and alerts 
other mental tools. . . . More interesting is when a pattern is detected that 
appears to be purposeful or goal directed and, secondarily, does not appear 
6See Stewart Guthrie, “A Cognitive Theory of Religion,” Current Anthropology 21 (1980), 
pp. 181–203; and also his Faces.
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to be caused by ordinary mechanical or biological causes. Such patterns 
may prompt HADD to attribute the traces to agency yet to be identified: 
unknown persons, animals, or space aliens, ghosts, or gods.7 
We are equipped with pattern detectors that are fine-tuned to detect agen-
cy.8 Upon the detection of agency the Theory of Mind (ToM) system be-
gins operating and attributes beliefs, desires, purposes, and so forth, to the 
postulated agent.9 A full-blown god concept may be fleshed out by HADD 
and ToM working together, automatically and non-reflectively.
This Attribution Account, championed by Stewart Guthrie, suggests 
that the god-faculty or sensus divinitatis can be roughly equated with the 
HADD-ToM conjunction.10 A system principally concerned with helping 
us detect and reason about humans also automatically gives us beliefs in 
gods without conscious inferential reflection. 
On the Attribution Account, then, what specific properties might these 
gods be prone to have? Much like humans, gods will have percepts, 
thoughts, beliefs, desires, goals, motivations, and emotions. Likely, they 
will have language, communication, and social relations. All of these basic 
attributes come automatically from ToM. Though Guthrie emphasizes the 
attribution of human properties (hence, he regards his as a new anthropo-
morphism theory of religion), he admits that the cognitive faculties at play 
invite more flexible input conditions than distinctly human agency. After 
all, they must accommodate non-human animals (such as saber-toothed 
tigers) and disguised or camouflaged agents. HADD had better be able 
to handle non-visible agents, and so, the idea of a fully invisible god does 
not deter this god-faculty at all. Beyond admitting the possibility that the 
god is invisible (and perhaps that is a chief motivation for postulating a 
god instead of a human), the Attribution Account does not specify any ad-
ditional superhuman traits. 
While not denying the possible role of HADD-experiences in generat-
ing or encouraging belief in gods, psychologist Jesse Bering has begun 
developing a variant on what we are calling the Attribution Account that 
allows for a broader range of experiences to trigger or excite thoughts 
about gods. On the basis of some experimental evidence with children, 
Bering argues for a pan-human, early-developing tendency to wonder 
‘what does it mean?’ or ‘why me?’ especially with regard to experiences 
of striking fortune or misfortune. Bering argues that when faced by these 
7Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe, pp. 36–37.
8See Scott Atran, In Gods We Trust (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 59–61.
9One might speculate that ToM developed as it became increasingly advantageous for 
primates to be able to successfully “guess” the beliefs, desires and intentions of competitors. 
This tendency to speculate about the intentions of competitors would then have been gener-
alized and applied to agentive accounts that HADD engendered. As Atran writes “Identify-
ing animate beings as agents, with goals and internal motivations, would allow our ancestors 
to anticipate goal-directed actions of predators, prey, friends, and foe and to profit from this 
in ways that enhanced survival and reproductive success. See Atran, In Gods We Trust, p. 61. 
10See Guthrie, Faces.
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sorts of experiences, we automatically speculate about the intentions of an 
unspecified agency that might account for the event and what the event 
means. Bering has dubbed this cognitive tendency the Existential Theory 
of Mind or eToM.11 In addition to HADD-experiences, events of striking 
fortune or misfortune, strange coincidences, and the like prompt us to 
consider the intentions of the someone who has orchestrated the event. 
In this way, eToM, like HADD, may stimulate thinking about and belief 
in gods—gods that influence human affairs, perhaps rewarding or pun-
ishing in a morally concerned way. Indeed, Bering and colleagues have 
suggested that the tendency to attribute events to the activities of morally-
concerned intentional agents, and hence, to believe that gods are watching 
as potential moral police, may be an adaptation that assisted in building 
cooperative communities.12
To summarize, if HADD + ToM + eToM is the god-faculty as the Attri-
bution Account suggests, it is activated by specific experiences, and god-
beliefs are not pre-existing tacit assumptions waiting to be activated, but 
are constructed in response to particular environmental stimulation. These 
experiences could be bumps in the night, faces in the clouds, or striking 
cases of fortune or misfortune. The god-belief that gets triggered will have 
human-like mental attributes but may also have supernatural powers, 
invisibility, and perhaps be morally interested in human affairs. Exactly 
which properties god possesses—cosmic creator, superknowing, super-
perceiving, immortal, immutable, or wholly good—is largely unspecified. 
If a version of the Attribution Account proves to be most accurate, we 
appear to have a sensus divinitatis that, in terms of input conditions, looks 
more like Plantinga’s experientially-triggered faculty. Especially according 
to Bering’s version that allows for a broader set of triggering experiences, 
this god-faculty generates empirically grounded beliefs in gods through 
means similar to Plantinga’s characterization. Considering this god-facul-
ty’s outputs, however, it lacks the specificity of Plantinga’s and looks more 
like Calvin’s general, hazy sense of superhuman agency of some sort. 
The Dispositional Account. We have dubbed this second account ‘dispo-
sitional’ because it suggests that a number of cognitive systems working in 
concert produce a general natural disposition for humans to embrace belief 
in gods of one sort or another. The most prominent representative of this 
account for why belief in gods is natural is anthropologist turned evo-
lutionary psychologist Pascal Boyer. Drawing upon cognitive and evolu-
tionary anthropology, Boyer identifies a number of cognitive systems that 
perform various tasks—everything from making sense of the mechanics 
of physical objects to negotiating social exchange relations—that converge 
to make belief in gods a normal, natural cultural expression.
11Jesse Bering, “The Existential Theory of Mind,” Review of General Psychology 6 (2002), 
pp. 3–24. 
12Jesse Bering and Dominic Johnson, “‘O Lord . . . You Perceive my Thoughts from Afar’: 
Recursiveness and the Evolution of Supernatural Agency,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 5 
(2005), pp. 118–142. 
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Boyer’s account uses an epidemiological model for explaining why some 
ideas (like belief in gods) are relatively common across cultures. Analo-
gously to studying the spread of disease in a population, to understand the 
spread of ideas in a population we must understand the properties of the 
host organism in relation to the potentially ‘infecting’ ideas and how they 
might spread from person to person.13 In relation to religious ideas, Boy-
er draws upon experimental evidence to argue that successful ideas will 
be those that (1) are easily and readily represented by human cognitive 
equipment, (2) are attention-demanding regardless of cultural conditions, 
(3) have rich ‘inferential potential’ such that they readily generate infer-
ences, explanations, and predictions relevant to many domains of human 
concern, and (4) motivate actions that reinforce belief, i.e., they matter.14 
Applying these four criteria for cultural success to beliefs in superhu-
man agents (gods), Boyer argues that the sorts of god concepts that are 
widespread (in contrast with some theological abstractions and hypothet-
ical supernatural concepts) meet all four.15 
(1) He notes that the sorts of gods that ordinary people talk about and be-
lieve in around the world tend to closely match the way people ordinarily 
think about other intentional agents. Though theological discourse might 
suggest complex or even opaque conceptions of deities, in day-to-day life 
people assume that gods have minds that direct their actions as much as is 
the case for people: gods have percepts that guide belief-formation; gods 
have goals and desires that they act upon using their beliefs about the 
world and about how to actualize those desires; and when their desires 
are satisfied they experience positive affect. The idea of a god automati-
cally activates ToM (Theory of Mind system) and all of its non-conscious 
assumptions. God concepts do not have to be built-up piece by piece but 
can ride on existing, pan-human conceptual systems. For instance, tell a 
child about a space-alien that has decided it wants to visit earth and you 
need not specify that the space-alien has beliefs, desires, emotions, and 
other mental properties. ToM delivers these assumptions ‘for free.’ 
(2) Though gods capitalize on ordinary cognition (making the concepts 
easy to remember, think about, and communicate), they deviate from 
ordinary concepts in some ways that make them attention-demanding, 
regardless of culture. That is, Boyer argues that a distinguishing feature 
of those agent-concepts we identify as ‘supernatural’ is that they violate 
a small number of tacit assumptions we have relevant to their intuitive 
ontology. So, if the space-alien mentioned above can read minds, a prop-
erty that breaches automatic ToM assumptions, then it has a feature that 
is attention-demanding. Mind-reading is distinctive regardless of cul-
ture because the basic assumptions delivered automatically by ToM are 
13Dan Sperber, Explaining Culture: A naturalistic approach (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).
14See Boyer, Religion Explained and Naturalness. Many of Scott Atran’s (In Gods), and Justin 
Barrett’s (Why Would Anyone Believe) arguments and observations are similar.
15See Boyer, Religion Explained.
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pan-human. Similarly, an invisible object is always and everywhere at-
tention-demanding because we presume that under normal conditions 
physical objects are visible. Having these sorts of features that violate our 
intuitive assumptions about things makes them counterintuitive in a tech-
nical sense. What counts as intuitive or counterintuitive in this sense is de-
termined not by just one cognitive system but by a whole host of systems. 
An idea could violate our intuitive assumptions generated by our naïve 
physics system, our folk biology system, our Theory of Mind system, our 
folk sociology system, or any number of others.16 
(3) Counterintuitive concepts have been shown to have a mnemonic and 
transmission advantages in some experimental contexts across cultures,17 
but being a counterintuitive agent is not enough to be a god. The result of 
the counterintuitive feature(s) must make the agent concept rich in ‘infer-
ential potential’—the ability to readily produce inferences, explanations, 
and predictions that would not normally follow from the object. Consider 
a tree that can listen to conversations. By virtue of the counterintuitive 
property of being able to listen to conversations, the tree has become an 
agent with some inferential potential. If the tree can listen to conversa-
tions, can it tell secrets about me? Does it know what I did near here last 
week? Similarly, a person that can read minds or is invisible seems to have 
more inferential potential than a person who has metal inside parts or an 
invisible potato. Boyer observes that religions around the world feature 
counterintuitive agent concepts with high inferential potential, not invis-
ible potatoes or vanishing sofas and the like. 
(4) Those concepts that have inferential potential in domains that deep-
ly concern humans in ordinary life, principally concerning the moral-lad-
en areas of social interaction, matter more to people and are more likely 
to be entertained and acted upon. The god who knows about how many 
ants are in the Amazon basin and will never act upon the knowledge 
is unlikely to matter to many people compared to the god who knows 
whether my neighbor is a practicing witch bent on destroying me and 
also may act upon that information. It is the latter kind of god that mo-
tivates changes in behavior including inhibiting anti-social actions, pro-
moting pro-social actions, and attempting to influence the gods through 
ritual or prayer. Acting upon beliefs helps increase one’s own commit-
ment as well as serving as a sign of commitment to others. These cultural 
selection pressures imply that morally interested gods will be more suc-
cessful than disinterested ones.
16For a more complete discussion see Boyer, Naturalness and Religion Explained. For evi-
dence regarding the various intuitive cognitive systems see Mapping the Mind: Domain Speci-
ficity in Cognition and Culture, ed. L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994).
17Pascal Boyer and Charles Ramble, “Cognitive Templates for Religious Concepts: Cross-
cultural Evidence for Recall of Counter-intuitive Representations,” Cognitive Science 25 
(2001), pp. 535–564; Justin Barrett and Melanie Nyhof, “Spreading Non-natural Concepts: 
the Role of Intuitive Conceptual Structures in Memory and Transmission of Cultural Materi-
als,” Journal of Cognition and Culture 1 (2001), pp. 69–100. 
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From the perspective of the Dispositional Account, rather than the god-
faculty being two or three closely-tied mechanisms, the god-faculty would 
be an emergent product or byproduct of a host of cognitive mechanisms. 
Belief in god arises naturally because the normal function of human cogni-
tive architecture in ordinary historically-prevalent human environments 
invites the rapid spread and resilience of god beliefs. God beliefs, then, 
are available in any cultural environment and human minds are predis-
posed to embrace them, act upon them, and pass them along. Because of 
how human minds work, minds are extremely vulnerable to infection by 
god beliefs. The requisite cognitive machinery—the god-faculty or sensus 
divinitatis—on this account is naturally in place in early childhood. In that 
way, it approximates Calvin’s emphasis on the innateness of the sensus 
divinitatis. Special experiences are not needed to trigger belief. (Boyer is 
skeptical that HADD plays an important role in generating or promot-
ing religious belief.) Also congruent with Calvin’s position, the outputs of 
this god-faculty are vague: the god will not be identical with a human (or 
it would not be attention-demanding and have richer inferential poten-
tial), but it could have any number of properties such as being invisible, 
superknowing, superperceiving, superpowerful. The bias toward par-
ticular superhuman properties is not part of the faculty aside from their 
being socially relevant. If an invisible god has access to my socially- and 
morally-relevant secrets, then invisibility is dispositionally supported, but 
mind-reading, or being all-knowing, or being extremely stealthy (but not 
invisible) are just as well supported. In terms of input conditions (no spe-
cial experiences) and outputs (vaguely super), the Dispositional Account 
fits well with Calvin’s notion of sensus divinitatis—certainly better than 
with Plantinga’s. Where the Dispositional Account fails to support Calvin 
is with regard to intuiting that the god is the cosmic creator. For this attri-
bute, insights from the third account—the Preparedness Account—would 
need to be imported.
The Preparedness Account. Developmental psychologists studying reli-
gious concept acquisition have proposed that the early-developing con-
ceptual structures in children include some biases that ‘prepare’ children 
to embrace the existence of gods. In particular, children may be predis-
posed by the default positions of their conceptual equipment to see the 
natural world as designed by a superpowerful being, one that is also likely 
to be superperceiving, superknowing and (perhaps) immortal. Such a set 
of predilections may help explain why belief in gods passes so easily from 
parents to children. So strong might these early-developing cognitive bi-
ases be that developmental psychologist Deborah Kelemen has suggested 
children are ‘intuitive theists.’18 
These bold claims are backed up by suggestive experimental evi-
dence. Research by Kelemen and her collaborators has shown that young 
18Deborah Kelemen, “Are Children ‘Intuitive Theists’? Reasoning about Purpose and De-
sign in Nature,” Psychology Science 15 (2004), p. 295. 
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American and British children (at least) have a tendency to see animals, 
other living things, and natural non-living objects (such as rocks) as pur-
posefully designed—a phenomenon she has labeled ‘promiscuous tele-
ology.’ Importantly, children offer and endorse teleological explanations 
for features of natural objects (e.g., a rock is pointy so that animals will 
not sit on it and crush it) that cannot simply be explained by appeal to 
adult instruction. Adults in America and the United Kingdom do not 
teach that the first river was there so that people could boat on it and that 
rocks are pointy so that animals don’t sit on them, and the like. But their 
children offer these explanations. Further, young children—perhaps as 
young as one-year-old, based on some experiments—appreciate that 
it takes someone to create order or purpose, not just something.19 They 
also appear to know that the someone is not human.20 No wonder that 
when presented with the idea that God designed and created the natural 
world, children find the idea so intuitively satisfying—so much so, in 
fact, that they are resistant to alternative explanations (such as evolu-
tion by natural selection) until fairly late in childhood.21 More research 
in other cultures is needed, but the emerging picture from what we are 
calling the Preparedness Approach is that the ordinary cognitive equip-
ment of children strongly encourages them to believe in some kind of 
creator deity or deities.
Additional research on children’s understanding of minds suggests 
that their default setting as preschoolers is that others’ minds are super-
knowing, superperceiving, and (perhaps) immortal. Children assume su-
perhuman capabilities on these dimensions when applied to people, to 
many animals, or to gods. They then pare back the super-ness as they 
learn about human perceptual fallibility, limitations on knowledge, and 
mortality. In this respect, a god that has super knowledge, super percep-
tion, and/or is immortal, requires less learning for these preschoolers than 
learning about humans. Due to the default settings on their conceptual 
systems, children are ‘prepared’ to understand many aspects of a super 
creator God.22
19See Kelemen, “Reasoning,” for a brief review; and G. E. Newman, F. C. Keil, V. Kuhlmeier, 
and K. Wynn, “12 Month-olds Know That Agents Defy Entropy: Exploring the Relationship 
Between Order and Intentionality,” Society for Research in Child Development (April 2005), At-
lanta, GA, for a recent experiment with toddlers.
20Susan Gelman and K. E. Kremer, “Understanding Natural cause: Children’s explanations 
of how objects and their properties originate,” Child Development 62 (1991), pp. 396–414.
21E. Margaret Evans, “Cognitive and Contextual factors in the Emergence of Diverse Be-
lief Systems: Creation versus Evolution,” Cognitive Psychology 42 (2001), pp. 217–266, found 
that adult instruction regarding the non-creationist origins of animals did not start getting 
traction until after ten years old.
22For a more complete review of the relevant literature see Justin Barrett and Rebekah 
Richert, “Anthropomorphism or Preparedness? Exploring Children’s God Concepts,” Review 
of Religious Research 44 (2003), pp. 300–312; and Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe, especially 
chapter 6. Evidence is thinner for the intuitiveness of immortality, but the presumption that 
minds do not automatically stop or die at some point has been suggested by Boyer, Reli-
gion Explained; Jessie Bering, “The Folk Psychology of Souls,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 
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From the perspective of the Preparedness Approach in cognitive sci-
ence of religion, the god-faculty or sensus divinitatis carries much more 
specificity than the other two approaches. It begins to look much like 
Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis in terms of the outputs it delivers. In terms of 
requisite inputs, however, the god-faculty more closely resembles Calvin’s 
characterization. It appears to emerge as a normal part of development, 
not requiring any special pivotal experiences. Children automatically see 
the natural world as having intelligent, intentional design and purpose 
and are prone to see the creator as superknowing, superperceiving, and 
immortal. The only ‘triggering’ necessary is for the particular name of the 
Creator to be specified.
Both the Dispositional and the Preparedness Approaches from the cog-
nitive science of religion emphasize early-developing cognitive architec-
ture that will typically produce belief in some kind of god as a matter of 
normal human development, usually in early childhood. In this respect 
they resonate with Calvin’s view of the sensus divinitatis, whereas the At-
tributional Approach and its emphasis on experiential triggers converges 
with Plantinga’s position. In terms of Plantinga-like specificity, however, 
only the Preparedness Approach suggests the level of detail, drawing 
closer to a sensus dei than the other two approaches.
A couple of additional qualifications may be helpful. The Attributional 
Approach presents the god-faculty as grounded in experience much like 
Plantinga’s account, but the sub-approach emphasizing the activity of 
HADD is not a perfect match with Plantinga’s account because Plantinga’s 
understanding of the widely realized grounding circumstances has little 
in common with HADD’s more specific generation of god beliefs primar-
ily in those circumstances under which the immediate response is flight 
or fight. Plantinga’s grounding conditions are more pastoral, tranquil and 
thoughtful (but non-inferential), more accommodating to the situations 
that trigger Bering’s eToM (existential Theory of Mind) than to the activa-
tion of HADD. HADD’s grounding conditions are (largely but not exclu-
sively) ignorance and terror. On this matter, Calvin may be closer to the 
HADD variant of the Attibutional Approach; he quotes Statius favorably: 
“Fear first made gods in the world.”23 While Calvin surely did not have 
HADD in mind when he affirmed Statius’s sentiment, he did believe that 
humans are compelled to believe in God under conditions of fear. 
Note that for all three cognitive science of religion approaches to the 
origins of god beliefs the cognitive equipment that does the work of pro-
ducing god beliefs (the god-faculty) is assumed to be a byproduct or span-
drel from an evolutionary perspective. That is, instead of being selected 
for because of its contribution to adaptive behaviors, the god-faculty has 
emerged out of the evolution of other competencies that are adaptations. 
29 (2006), pp. 453–498; and perhaps most thoroughly by Paul Bloom in Descartes’ Baby: How 
the Science of Child Development Explains what Makes us Human (New York, New York: Basic 
Books, 2004).
23Calvin, Institutes: I. iv. 4.
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Neither Calvin nor Plantinga treat belief in God as an evolutionary span-
drel as suggested by those who offer evolutionary accounts. According 
to Plantinga, belief in God is the direct and intended product of the god-
faculty, not an epiphenomenal by-product of an agency-detecting device. 
If the HADD-emphasizing approach is correct, its localized, fear-based 
activation of any number of agent beliefs would suggest that a world of 
ghosts, fairies, and goblins may be the direct by-product of our god-facul-
ty, not monotheism. 
Reformed rejoinders. Reformed thinkers might offer two responses to 
these differences. First, they might contend that the sensus divinitatis is 
present in humans but not in quite the shape that they originally speci-
fied; for instance, that the sensus divinitatis is HADD + ToM. Why, after all, 
could God not have produced in us, through the processes of evolution, a 
god-faculty that makes humans universally aware of God under widely re-
alized circumstances (just different ones from those that Calvin asserted)? 
There are analogues here to, say, the Freudian critiques of religious be-
lief. Freud contended that we wish God into existence and “God” hears 
our prayers: God can tame nature, help us accept our fate, and reward us 
for our sufferings. By revealing our desire for the divine, masking deeply 
insecure self-interest, Freud thinks he has explained God away. But a Re-
formed thinker might hold that Freud is right in his explanation of belief in 
God but not in his explaining it away; that is, she might think that Freud’s 
account is an accurate description of the divinely implanted, truth-aimed 
sensus divinitatis and so is a proper ground of belief. Why, after all, could 
God not have produced in humans a Freudian god-faculty that makes 
humans universally aware of God under widely realized circumstances? 
After all, the sensus divinitatis, assuming there is one, must have some de-
terminate shape or form. Why not the Freudian or HADD shape and form? 
As Plantinga writes of Freud-Marx critiques of belief in God: “To show 
that there are natural processes that produce religious belief does noth-
ing . . . to discredit it; perhaps God designed us in such a way that it is by 
virtue of those processes that we come to have knowledge of him.”24 Surely 
God can use ignoble vessels, even spandrels, to transport belief in God. 
Explaining or Explaining Away?
While Reformed epistemologists defend the rationality of religious belief, 
some cognitive scientists of religion are wont to explain religion away. 
Both groups contend that religious belief producing mechanisms are both 
natural and universal, but evolutionary cognitive scientists often contend 
that by showing that religious belief is natural, it is, thereby, shown to 
be unwarranted. Pascal Boyer, for example, writes: “In a cultural context 
where this hugely successful [scientific] way of understanding the world 
has debunked one supernatural claim after another, there is a strong im-
pulse [among the religious] to find at least one domain where it would 
be possible to trump the scientist. . . . But evolution and microbiology 
24Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, p. 145.
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crushed all this.”25 He claims that evolutionary cognitive science explains 
religion away as an “airy nothing,” as but a byproduct of evolved human 
minds.26 Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there is a success-
ful, natural explanation of religious belief of the kind discussed in this 
paper.27 Would such an explanation per force undermine the rational jus-
tification of religious belief?
The first thing to note is that belief spandrels or by-product beliefs 
may be true and justified (and are often widely accepted as such). Let 
us proceed by analogy. Assuming the evolutionary origins of our cogni-
tive faculties, modern science is constituted by belief spandrels. Modern 
science is a by-product of cognitive faculties that were developed long 
before, say, 1600. The relevantly specified cognitive faculties developed 
to help us fight, flee, feed and reproduce.28 These faculties proved enor-
mously useful for millennia. Yet they were not developed to help Homo 
sapiens grasp relativity theory or the advanced mathematics that relativ-
ity theory includes. Molecular biologist Gunther Stent has argued that 
the innate structures of the evolved brain are well suited to handling 
immediate experience but are poorly suited to those areas of most in-
terest to scientific inquiry.29 Noam Chomsky puts the problem thusly: 
“The experience that shaped the course of evolution offers no hint of the 
problems to be faced in the sciences, and the ability to solve these prob-
lems could hardly have been a factor in evolution.”30 Furthermore, Scott 
Atraní’s claim that religions are not adaptations, have no evolutionary 
functions, and were not produced directly via natural selection could be 
made of modern science (and, no doubt, many other domains of human 
inquiry) as well. And if one rejects belief in God because it is an evolution-
ary spandrel, one should also, mutatis mutandis, reject modern science’s 
constituent beliefs. Indeed, Atran’s arguments are self-reflexive: Atranic 
speculation is an evolutionary spandrel, therefore, it should be rejected. 
But perhaps a better way to proceed is simply to treat the deliverances 
of our cognitive faculties as innocent (prima facie justified) until proven 
guilty (ultima facie defeated). Moreover, one might think that most of our 
cognitive faculties or faculties do double duty: their original, primitive 
survival-enhancing duty and their much later reflective, expansive, non-
survival enhancing manifestations.
25Boyer, Religion Explained, p. 76.
26Ibid., 4.
27We don’t assume that there is as yet a successful natural explanation of religious belief. 
The jury is still out on that.
28One might think, given that truth is irrelevant to the selection process, that true beliefs 
are irrelevant; that is, that survival behavior is all that is selected (see Plantinga, Warrant and 
Proper Function, pp. 216–237). 
29Stent, “Limits to the Scientific Understanding of Man,” Science 187 no. 4181 (1975), pp. 
1052–1057.
30Noam Chomsky, Language and the Problem of Knowledge (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
MIT Press, 1987), p. 158.
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But perhaps the issue of justification goes as follows. Unlike scientific 
beliefs for which there is publicly available evidence, there is no such evi-
dence for God’s existence and so the god-faculty produces beliefs in an 
evidential vacuum. Moreover, beliefs produced by the god-faculty in the 
absence of evidence are wildly divergent and so the god-faculty cannot 
produce justified religious beliefs because it is not reliable. After all, the 
god-faculty, without divine prompting, produces beliefs in a multiplicity 
of gods, angels, fairies, demons, etc. Even supposing the truth of monothe-
ism, the reliability of the god-faculty is less than 1/2 (supposing we take 
as the denominator the number of kinds of entities produced by the god-
faculty and as the numerator the single class of Yahwistic monotheism). 
Reformed thinkers might respond that the initial function of the god-
faculty alone (that is, independent of any particular religious experience 
or putative revelation) is to make humans aware, in the most ordinary 
of circumstances, of the sacred dimension of reality rather than clearly 
defined Judeo-Christian conceptions of God; on this view, God might be 
willing to concede culturally specific differences in order to produce, by 
and large, true belief in a divine being. So, while the god-faculty alone (in 
ordinary circumstances unprompted by God) may be unreliable in secur-
ing belief in Yahweh and Yahweh alone, it may be reliable in producing 
belief in a divinity. Calvin himself claimed little specific knowledge of di-
vinity through the sensus divinitatis; one’s slight taste of divinity, recall, is 
impure and unclear. Indeed, such surface impurities and unclarities might 
include elves and fairies. But such culturally informed but divergent be-
liefs may contain a set of common core beliefs in, say, a superknower that 
exercises moral providence. This core knowledge of divinity may provide 
adequate moral and spiritual truth to bind humans into cooperative com-
munities and to begin the human spiritual journey. So the god-faculty 
alone (without any special supernatural prompting) could produce reli-
able core beliefs in a morally provident superknower despite apparent 
surface and culturally specific dissimilarities. If there is a god, then the 
god-faculty may be reliable even though it produces surface beliefs that 
are not fully true.
However, while beliefs produced by one’s cognitive faculties in the ap-
propriate circumstances may be prima facie justified or rational, the justifi-
cation or rationality of those beliefs may be defeated by being overridden 
or undermined by others of one’s beliefs. Subsequent increases in human 
knowledge, especially as one becomes aware of natural explanations of 
phenomena previously accounted for by, say, elves or nature “gods,” may 
defeat the justification of these quasi-divine beliefs. The Reformed episte-
mologist shouldn’t be concerned that these false religious beliefs are win-
nowed away by increases in knowledge. Indeed, she might think that the 
proper role of reason in these cases is to assist in the rejection of false, 
finite, or defective religious beliefs.
Should this winnowing extend to all religious beliefs? Should the nat-
ural explanation of religious beliefs undermine or override all of one’s 
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initially justified religious beliefs? Are such beliefs, in the absence of pub-
licly available evidence, per force defective? For purposes of the argument, 
let us suppose, contra important voices to the contrary, that there is no 
publicly available evidence in support of theism. Do “scientific,” natural 
explanations of religious belief in the absence of publicly available evi-
dence imply that religious beliefs are irrational or unjustified? 
Suppose there is a Yahwistic god and that one has an experience of this 
god. In this circumstance, according to the Reformed epistemologist, the 
god-faculty is operating under optimal conditions for producing reliable 
religious beliefs. These experiential grounds, cognized through the god-
faculty, are justifying grounds of religious belief. The development of the 
god-faculty through evolutionary processes prepares one for the acquisi-
tion of true religious beliefs when one has genuine religious experiences.31 
The god-faculty produces true religious beliefs in optimal environments 
(that is, those where one is prompted by God and not by things that go 
bump in the night). How those faculties were developed is irrelevant to 
the account of the belief’s justification. Coming to learn that these faculties 
were developed naturally does not constitute a defeater for the justifica-
tion of belief in God.32 
So, for the religious believer with an experience of God, natural ex-
planations of religious belief need not defeat one’s justification for belief 
in God.  The atheist or agnostic inquirer, however, might affirm the god-
faculty as the best explanation of relatively universal religious beliefs yet 
hold the faculty to be unreliable since, according to them, there is no god. 
Nothing in their experience forces them to accept the rationality of theistic 
belief for them. But we could not know that the god-faculty is unreliable in 
this sort of case unless we already know that there is no God. Of course, 
if one doesn’t believe in God, one won’t believe the god-faculty to be reli-
able, but one’s beliefs on this matter scarcely constitute evidence that there 
is no God. 
Obstinacy in Belief
One area of agreement between Calvin and cognitive science is that belief 
in God is the natural state of belief for humans and can never be entire-
ly gotten rid of. Belief in God is produced by our primal and instinctive 
dispositions to believe in various circumstances. Unbelief is unnatural in 
the sense that rejection of God’s existence involves suppressing our natu-
ral belief dispositions. It may not be unnatural all things considered (for 
presumably unbelief involves other, natural cognitive faculties such as 
reasoning), but widespread disbelief in any and all supernatural agents 
is not primitive and instinctual and so must be cultivated. Yet, given the 
promptings of our primitive and instinctive god and immortality facul-
31Even if there is no publicly available evidence, religious experience may constitute pri-
vately available evidence. See Alston, Perceiving God.
32This parallels Plantinga’s discussion of warranted Christian belief in Plantinga, War-
ranted Christian Belief.
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ties, belief in God may never be entirely erased from one’s set of beliefs; 
it will repeatedly find its way back in spite of our best efforts to resist it. 
Studies in cognitive science and personal reflection on the part of athe-
istic cognitive scientists has shown that religious beliefs come creeping 
back into one’s consciousness despite one’s best efforts to rid oneself of 
them. For example, the death of a loved one can provoke a native belief in 
the immortality of souls and very frightening experiences can lead one to 
pray to or blame God.33
Conclusion
Reformed epistemology and the cognitive science of religion have con-
verged on the nature and extent of the god-faculty and the beliefs thusly 
produced. The empirical work of the cognitive scientist can be seen as 
both a support for and a challenge to particular philosophical or theo-
logical understandings of the god-faculty and god-beliefs. We have not ex-
plored the Reformed epistemologist’s responses in the desired depth; nor 
have we explored all of the Reformed epistemologist’s possible responses. 
Yet we have indicated ways the Reformed epistemologist might respond 
to the similarities, differences and dismissiveness of some of the views of 
some cognitive scientists. Since the cognitive science is in its infancy, it’s 
too early to commit to any particular cognitive model for understanding 
and explaining the god-faculty. Many of the claims of cognitive science of 
religion require additional empirical evidence—particularly cross-cultur-
al data—before confident universal conclusions may be drawn. If these 
results can be universalized and made consonant with Reformed episte-
mology, we may find empirical support for a philosophical theory. This 
support, however, may come with some costs, requiring the rethinking of 
the god-faculty or the justification of religious belief. 
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33See Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe, chap. 8; and Bering, “The Existential Theory of 
Mind.”
